Three educational scenarios for the future : lessons from the sociology of knowledge by Young, Michael & Muller, Johan
Challenge 3: Creativity, Innovation and Communication
 Three scenarios for the future: Lessons  from the sociology of knowledge
Michael Young and Johan Muller 
 
Key words
sociology of knowledge, social realism,  Emile Durkheim, Basil Bernstein,  




This review draws on social realist approaches in the sociology of knowledge and in light of them  
constructs three scenarios for the future of education in the next decades. The primary  focus of  
the review is on one of the most crucial questions facing educational policy makers-  the 
relationship between school and everyday or common sense knowledge. The different  
 possibilities for how the school/nonschool knowledge boundaries might be approached are  
expressed in three scenarios - 'boundaries as given',  'a boundary-less world’ and the idea of  
‘boundary maintenance  as a condition for boundary crossing’. The educational implications of  
each are explored and the review makes the case for  the third scenario. The factors likely to  
make one or other scenario dominate educational policy in the next 20-30 years are also  
considered. 
 Introduction
‘Thinking about the future’ has not been a major strand of research and theory in the 
sociology of education. As a result, ‘futures thinking’ in education has been largely left to 
educationalists who give little explicit attention to sociological issues, especially those 
concerned with the question of  knowledge.  The typical approach of  such thinking is to 
identify what is seen as the increasing mismatch between the schools and changes in the 
wider society and  how the formal education system,  and schools in particular, almost 
systematically resist such changes. The assumptions of such ‘future thinking’ tend to be 
that certain wider social changes are not only inevitable but of  positive benefit to 
humanity and that schooling in the future will have to follow them. The ‘following’ is 
invariably unproblematic.
The future of schooling  in these scenarios is one of  throwing off what is seen as its 
medieval past and adapting  to global trends towards greater flexibility and openness to 
change from individuals;  as a consequence it is predicted that  schooling will  become 
less and less differentiated from other social institutions.   The following two not un-
typical, but in many ways very different examples of this kind of ‘future thinking’ will 
illustrate this point.  The first is by Peter Mortimore, the former Director of the Institute 
of Education. In a recent Guardian column, he wrote:
Many changes are affecting western societies. New citizens are importing different 
cultural and religious traditions, families are taking on different configurations, work hours 
are becoming more varied and the internet is taking over our shopping, entertainment 
and information-gathering activities….People have become more conscious of individual 
rights, but are less deferential to those in authority…. 
Yet English schools….are slow to change… all but the most confident of headteachers 
are inhibited from experimenting with new approaches. 
Many aspects of schooling have changed…the abolition of corporal punishment and the 
introduction of a national curriculum ….But should there be more fundamental changes in 
how pupils are educated in order to better  match  the way people live today? (our 
italics) Should issues such as the sustainability of the environment and the dangers of 
obesity, drugs and Aids and, in the light of current events, financial education be given 
more prominence? ( Mortimore 2008) 
Our second more overtly academic example is a recent paper by the distinguished 
sociolinguist, Gunther Kress (2008).  Kress argues that global social changes are calling 
into question the appropriateness of  : 
• our dominant myths about education that are derived from an already quite distant 
past, and 
• our assumptions about the  homogeneity of the audience for education and .. 
about the ontological/epistemological security of “knowledge’ … 
The school is increasingly left, Kress argues,  “without its legitimating purposes”. It is 
faced with   “an emblematic shift in the emphasis of educational rhetoric from teaching to 
learning….No institution (any longer) regulates what is to be learned…no clear  
curriculum exists…and knowledge is made by learners in relation to their needs, as tools 
to solve problems encountered by them in their lifeworlds” 
(our addition in brackets) 
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Kress goes on to claim that “a significant proportion of the young are alienated from 
school- they no longer judge school to be of relevance to …the world as they experience 
it. …What the school actually offers is … no longer of interest to these young people…. 
the responsibility  (for the transition from school to work)  now falls on the young 
themselves.” Kress(2008) 
Mortimore is pointing to a greater emphasis, in a possible ‘curriculum of the future ‘on 
‘relevant’ and contemporary  themes.  His argument is not unlike that of the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority in their new curriculum proposals which shift 
the balance in school science from subject content to what might be  relevant and have 
personal meaning for pupils. However neither the QCA nor Mortimore tell us  how  such 
themes might be addressed by teachers  in ways that go beyond a sharing of opinions on 
issues such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic that involve complex bodies of specialist 
knowledge in fields such as micro-biology. 
 Kress tells us that the future is here today and that it is largely educationalists, unlike 
young people, who are too blinded by tradition to see it. Whether his future in which 
schools adapt and respond to the ‘demands’ of the next generation will really empower 
and enthuse them is another question. 
In this review we will draw on the sociology of knowledge to tell a rather different story 
about schooling and its possible  futures in an increasingly global society.  We shall argue 
that a focus on the conservative nature of educational institutions, their resistance to 
change and their perpetuation of anachronistic forms of authority and archaic curriculum 
priorities that bear little relation to the demands of the contemporary world,  is limited as 
a basis for ‘future thinking’ in a number of ways.   Firstly it fails to distinguish between 
the inherently  ‘conservative’ role of schools as institutions involved in the  ‘transmission 
of  knowledge’ from one generation to another and conservatism as a tendency of all 
institutions to resist  change and preserve privileges.  We need to distinguish between 
these two forms of conservatism if we are to envisage a very different future in which 
societies will still want schools to transmit knowledge (and values) from one generation 
to another.   Secondly, a focus on changes in the wider society, and how schools should 
adapt to them plays down the extent to which, if schools are agencies of cultural 
transmission, they will have a logic of their own which may go against the immediate 
demands of  young people even it is in their  long term interests. 
Education and the sociology of knowledge
Research in the sociology of knowledge has had a significant if controversial influence 
on debates about  education in the UK and elsewhere, at least since the early 1970’s. 
Although this influence can be traced back to the appointment of Karl Mannheim to the 
Chair in Sociology of Education at the Institute of Education in 1946,  it was not until the 
1970s that sociological ideas about knowledge began to be taken seriously within 
educational studies. Furthermore it has only been in the last decade that a distinctive 
social realist research tradition- the theme of this review- began to emerge in the UK 
(Moore, 2004; Young, 2007), in South Africa (Muller, 2000; Gamble, 2006), in Australia 
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(Weelahan, 2007),  and in a number of   Latin American and other European countries 
such as Portugal and Greece. The  major resource for this work  has been the 
ideas/theories of  the  English sociologist,  Basil Bernstein,  who died in 2001,  and the 
inspiration that he found in the ideas of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim writing a 
century ago. However this emerging tradition in the sociology of education has also 
drawn on a number of wider developments in (i) sociological theory(Collins 2000), 
Bourdieu(2004) and Gellner(1996), (ii)  the sociology of science (Collins & Evans, 
2007), (iii) philosophy ( Norris, 2006: Bachelard (see Tiles 1984) and (iv) linguistics (the 
Sydney Systematic Functional Linguistics Group who explicitly tie the notion of 
knowledge to the wellsprings of language [Christie & Martin, 2007]).
This review will therefore begin by locating the intellectual origins of a specifically 
realist sociology of knowledge in the early 20th century  work of  Emile Durkheim (1984). 
However we will suggest that its emergence as a strand  of research within the sociology 
of education has been as much  a critical response to other developments in the broad 
field of educational research and  in educational policy as a re-discovery of a social 
realist tradition in mainstream  sociology. These developments in social and  educational 
research  include:
(i) social constructivist/post modernist views of knowledge and truth that are found 
in much recent sociology of education as well as more broadly across the humanities and 
social sciences (Kronman 2008) 
(ii) socio-cultural theories of learning that have,  implicitly and sometimes explicitly, 
dominated educational research in a range of fields such as science education, work based 
learning and diversity studies. 
These theoretical developments have been paralleled by a number of policy 
developments that have their roots in the new –neo-liberal- politics and its celebration of 
markets. Examples include:    
(a) the increasingly ‘instrumental’ focus of educational policy which conceptually,  albeit 
not politically, has many affinities with (i) and (ii) above .  For example, it is increasingly 
difficult to make a public  case for ‘education for its own sake- i.e ‘to promote young 
people’s intellectual development’ 
(b) the uncritical enthusiasm of research funders and policy makers for the 
educational potential of digital technologies and the challenge that this poses for the role 
of specialist educational institutions and the role of teachers.   (Keen(2007); 
Sharples(2007) 
The distinctive implications of the ideas discussed in this review follow from  their 
recognition  of (a) the necessary objectivity of knowledge as a condition for any kind of 
enquiry or reliable prediction about the future and (b)  that knowledge is  emergent from 
and not reducible to the contexts in which it is produced and acquired. At the same time 
a social realist approach  implies an explicitly historical approach to thinking about future 
trends.  Without such a historical approach to knowledge, predictions are likely to be 
little more than extrapolations from the present as if the present itself had no history.  
The dilemma posed by a recognition that knowledge is both ‘objective’ and historical is 
4
not new and takes us back at least to Hegel. It is a dilemma that lay at the heart of the 
sociology of knowledge that was established a century ago  by Durkheim, Weber and 
Mannheim and has been continued more recently by  Habermas, Randall Collins and 
others. 
This review argues that it is important to distinguish what we refer to as  ‘social realist’ 
theories of knowledge from the two approaches that have set the terms for most recent 
debates about knowledge in  the social sciences and in philosophy.  The first of these 
approaches - symbolised perhaps by logical positivism and its empiricist parallels in the 
social sciences - can be described as invoking  an  a-social  or ‘under-socialised’ 
epistemology  that defines knowledge as sets of  verifiable propositions and the methods 
for testing them.  It  treats their social production in particular historical contexts and 
within the boundaries of particular disciplines  as implicit or taken for granted.   The 
second approach which arose in direct response to the first - what we here refer to as 
‘over-socialised’ - plays down the propositional character of knowledge and reduces 
questions of epistemology  to “who knows?” and to the identification of  knowers and 
their practices.    In contrast,  a social realist theory sees knowledge as involving sets of 
systematically related concepts and methods for their empirical exploration  and  the 
increasingly specialised and  historically located ‘communities of enquirers’ with their 
distinctive commitment to the search for truth (Charles Peirce) and the social institutions 
in which they are located.  
A social realist approach to knowledge and its educational implications
The emergent, non-reducible and socially differentiated  character of knowledge has, we 
suggest, potentially  profound educational implications. Examples of such implications, 
which deserve a paper in themselves,  we can only list here,  include the importance of:
• the distinction between curricula and pedagogy
• the ‘non-arbitrariness’ of boundaries between knowledge domains and between 
school and non-school knowledge
• the ‘objective’ basis of the authority and professionalism  of teachers 
and other experts
• the inescapably hierarchical nature of pedagogy
• the conditions for  and definitions of creativity and  innovation
• the epistemological  constraints on the scope of policies for  widening 
participation and promoting social inclusion. 
• the limitations of ‘generic skills’ as a model for ‘general education’
• The crucial importance of ‘subject –specific content’  and the importance of 
distinguishing between ‘subject content’ - as the relatively stable  component of subject 
knowledge-  and ‘information’ (such as what is available on the internet ) which is never 
stable and always changing. 
Running through all these themes is an emphasis on  the irreducible differentiatedness of 
knowledge. Knowledge is structured, in part independently of how we acquire it and 
knowledge fields differ in their internal coherence, their principles of cohesion, and their 
procedures for producing new knowledge. These internal differences are mirrored in the 
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different forms of social relation between the actors that practice in the institutions of 
those fields: knowledge relations and social relations vary in tandem. 
The distinction between the  ‘structural’ and ‘social’ conservatism of education 
institutions referred to earlier  is important in  identifying the epistemological 
‘constraints’ on curriculum design. Social realism views the former as a condition for 
progress and innovation and the acquisition of knowledge. However it is easily confused, 
especially by those seeing themselves as educational radicals,  with the  ‘social ‘  
conservatism  of  educational institutions which  preserves the  power and privileges of 
particular groups.  Gramsci’s  well known critique of the Gentile reforms of Italian 
education in the 1920’s makes this distinction clearly. He defended the structural 
conservatism of the old curriculum against the  ‘progressive ‘ changes proposed by 
Gentile which would exclude subordinate classes from access to knowledge  via spurious 
forms of  ‘vocationalism’ (Entwistle 1979)  
The second distinction that we want to make  is between two meanings of the idea of 
education as ‘cultural  transmission’.  In everyday language,  transmission  refers to 
‘passing on’- of a signal, a message or a disease. Education also involves a ‘passing on’ , 
of knowledge, or more broadly,  a culture. However, whereas the everyday meaning of 
the transmission of a signal is a one-way movement in which the receiver is the passive 
recipient , the cultural or knowledge transmission that is associated with education is a 
much more complex process that  involving the  active role of the ‘recipient’ in making 
the knowledge his/her own. The research literature mistakenly polarises these two 
meanings of transmission. An example is  Anna Sfard’s well known and in many ways 
perceptive essay on theories of learning (1994). Her analysis leaves the polarity  un-
resolved because she treats learning as a generic process separable from ‘what is learned’. 
In contrast,  we would argue that  ‘learning’ always implies ‘learning something’; there is 
a parallel here with Alastair McIntyre’s(2002)  argument that teaching as a generic 
concept is empty- we always ‘teach something’. It follows that learning necessarily 
involves 
cultural transmission or the transmission of knowledge. The transmission of culture, 
increasingly but not exclusively through educational institutions, from generation to 
generation, is what distinguishes human from animal ‘societies, and enables them to 
reproduce and progress. Cultural transmission is always reproductive and potentially 
progressive. 
We argue  that a social realist approach which gives priority to the knowledge that is (or 
is not) being transmitted, while at odds with much contemporary educational thinking 
which focuses largely on  the learner and his/her experience,  provides a more reliable 
basis for identifying underlying trends and  imagining possible  futures or, in Eric Olin 
Wright’s evocative phrase), ‘real utopias’. 
By emphasising the social differentiation of  both knowledge and institutions, social 
realist approaches challenge the  widely shared  assumption that boundaries are always 
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barriers to be overcome rather than also conditions for innovation and the production and 
acquisition of new knowledge. As Bernstein (Bernstein 2000) argues, boundaries play an 
important role in creating learner identities and are thus the conditions for acquiring 
‘powerful knowledge’ as well as barriers to learning.  It follows that: 
• the global future of education  is not necessarily  one of  greater flexibility, 
portability,  and transparency
 • it will continue to be important to differentiate learning in schools, colleges and 
universities from learning in homes ,  workplaces and communities 
• experience itself cannot  be  the sole or primary  basis for the curriculum,  and 
• as learners cannot actually  ‘construct’  their own learning (because, in Foucault’s 
pithy phrase, they can’t know what they don’t know) the role of   teachers cannot be 
reduced to that of  guide and facilitator rather than as a source of strategies and expertise. 
Three scenarios for the future
The role of boundaries and the  social differentiation of knowledge are the key principles 
which we draw from the sociology of knowledge in identifying  possible future scenarios. 
Bearing these assumptions in mind the next section   explores three possible futures 
scenarios for the next 20-30  years. 
The Three Futures
Future 1- Boundaries are given and fixed –the ‘Future’ is associated with  a naturalised 
or  ‘under-socialised’ concept of knowledge; 
Future 2 – The end of boundaries - the ‘Future’ is associated with  an ‘over-socialised’ 
concept of knowledge; 
Future 3- Boundary maintenance as  prior to  boundary crossing. It follows that  it is the 
variable  relation between the two  that is the condition for the creation and acquisition of 
new knowledge. 
 Future 1 – Boundaries as given and fixed -  a naturalised or  under-socialised concept  
of knowledge 
Every mass education system has its origins in an elite system;  that is, a system for 
transmitting elite cultural knowledge to the ‘select few’, sometimes the ‘elect’, who are 
most usually the offspring of the dominant classes. Such systems involve induction into 
the dominant knowledge traditions that keep them dominant. These traditions are 
overwhelmingly static, because their boundaries are fixed by social imperatives that 
override the conditions for knowledge and its innate dynamism, fecundity and openness 
to change. They are socially conservative in this dual static sense. By the end of the 
nineteenth century (at least in Europe) , two democratising social forces bore down on 
this elite template. The first was the generalized demand from below for access to 
schooling - the demand for it to massify. The second was the explosion of knowledge 
about the social and natural worlds. This explosion of ‘powerful knowledge’ challenged 
the traditional idea of the curriculum as ‘knowledge of the powerful’, and gradually but 
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steadily eclipsed the outmoded canons of the old elite system.  The  elite educational 
systems found in every country  have had to deal with this dual challenge. Future 1 
represents attempts to continue the elite system whilst opening it to access to the broader 
populace as marginally as possible.  
At some point, expanding elite systems meet a number of in-built limits with which they 
have to contend. These limits include:
(i) the inability of labour markets to absorb any more workers trained 
in the same conservative mould.
(ii)   the limits of a mass schooling system to induct all children with 
equal success into elite knowledge traditions that require the 
middle class home as a critical adjunct and  condition for that 
success.  
To widely varying degrees all  mass schooling systems have failed to overcome these 
limits and failed to ‘compensate’ for the unequal distribution of conditions for success 
that they give rise to.  
The default position to deal with this on-going scandal has been one or other type of 
tracked or streamed system which preserves the elite track for the elite and a trickle of the 
mass. For the rest, one or more kinds of vocational track is provided, that in their worst 
forms represent ‘dumbed down’ versions of elite knowledge – mathematical literacy, 
communications or ‘popular science’ for example (Young 2007, Wheelahan, 2007). This 
so-called  ‘vocational’ curriculum becomes proceduralised, increasingly so with 
technology , (Lauder’s(2008) ‘digital Fordism’) – and access to ‘powerful knowledge’ is 
blocked for the mass.  The result is a system overtly stratified along social class lines, 
with schooling as its principal instrument.  Its destiny is to be perpetually seen as unfair, 
and hence resisted. In this sense, Future 1 is a recipe for social divisiveness, inequality, 
unhappiness,  and conflict. The mechanism producing the injustice is perceived, by those 
who oppose it, to be the form of the elite curriculum - overt, strictly stipulated and paced. 
Its boundedness is seen to be the main  problem, and the condition for greater social 
justice and less inequality, at least as far as the Future 2-ists are concerned, is the 
removal of these boundaries.
In the Future 1 scenario there are few new sources of innovation within the education 
system. Education and the wider context will continue to exist as two parallel worlds. 
We can however predict increased differentiation based on locality and the conservatism 
of traditional cultures,  increasing divisions between North and South, and, for example, 
between different fundamentalist traditions. Treating boundaries as given, not social, 
becomes in this scenario a basis for maintaining and legitimising  existing power 
relations  and restricting sources of debate. There are of course no pure forms of Future 1 
even in autocracies; however it would be a mistake to think that Future 1 has no future. 
Many elements of Future 1 linger in the English system, for example (Fitz, Davies & 
Evans, 2006) and it is probable that they will linger on well into the future. The worst 
case consequence of this scenario is expressed most stridently and evocatively in Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1993) and more colloquially in George Bush’s ‘War 
on Terror’. 
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Future 2 -  the end of boundaries - an ‘over-socialised’ concept of knowledge  
As we have already indicated, Future 2 is born in ‘progressive’ opposition to Future 1. 
It  envisages a steady  weakening of boundaries, a de-differentiation of knowledge and 
institutions, a blurring of labour market sectors,  and a greater emphasis on generic 
outcomes rather than inputs  as  instruments of equalization and accountability. Elements 
of the  ideals of Future 2  can be seen in the scenarios suggested by Mortimore and Kress 
which we  referred to at the beginning of this review1.  
To the extent to which such learner-directed trends, coupled with the wider introduction 
of digital technologies, are endorsed,    we shall see a de-professionalisation of teaching 
at all levels and the de-specialisation of research. It is a trend that will meet resistance 
from the forces underpinning Future 1, but it is a trend everywhere gaining ground in 
Europe and beyond. 
The curricular ‘instrument of choice’ for those seeking to pursue  boundary-weakening 
and de-differentiation is, using the term in its broadest sense, modularization. Among the 
expressions of this boundary weakening, various combinations of the following are likely 
to be found: 
• the ‘integration’ of school subjects - as boundaries between subjects and 
between school knowledge and everyday knowledge are weakened;
• the stipulation of curricular content in generic, usually skill or outcome 
terms –also as a consequence of boundaries between subjects and 
knowledge fields being weakened; 
• the promotion of formative over summative assessment - as  boundaries 
between the  achievement scores of different learners are weakened; 
• the introduction of unified national qualification frameworks - as the 
boundaries between different (especially academic and vocational) 
qualifications are weakened; 
• the promotion of facilitative rather than directive teaching – as the 
boundaries between experts and neophyte learners are weakened. 
Our position, as we stated above, is that educational  boundaries are social but also  real; 
that is, they cannot be dissolved, at least in the short term, without serious consequences 
for most if  not all learners. What such  de-differentiating mechanisms are most likely to 
achieve is not to dissolve the boundaries, but to render them invisible- an invisibility that 
is exaggerated for the more disadvantaged.  That is to say, against their best intents, the 
main effects of Future 2-ists - those endorsing  progressive pedagogy and its variants - 
is to render the contours of knowledge and learning invisible to the very learners that the 
pedagogy was designed to favour-  namely the learners, invariably but not always those 
from low income homes, who fall behind their peers.  Where Future 1 produces 
stratification and resistance, Future 2 also  produces stratification; however, this time it 
is of a covert kind, because the overt targets associated with  Future 1 are now 
1
 This does not mean that we imply that either Mortimore or Kress would endorse our 
characterization of Future 2 
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submerged, and the unfortunate learners who stumble – for stumble they do – cannot see 
what it is, this time, that causes them to stumble. This too causes disaffection, a 
disaffection that,  together with more specifically material factors, lies at the root of much 
of the  youth apathy described so well by Gunther Kress,  as well as its more destructive 
cultural forms, such as  self and other-directed violence.   In other words, whereas the 
overt stratification of Future 1 leads, at least optimally, to opposition and the  ‘voice’ of 
the excluded, the covert stratification of Future 2 leads increasingly  to a variety of 
individualized  ‘exit’ strategies that feed a disintegrating public culture. The proponents 
of Future 2 find themselves unwittingly becoming  the legitimisers of this trend in their 
denial of the special worth of expert knowledge, in their at least implied  validation of all 
cultural forms as equal 2, and in their uncritical celebration  of experiential forms of 
knowing. 
The  ‘end of boundaries’ scenario of Future 2 is unlikely to lead to  access to specialist 
knowledge disappearing in  the  elite and private sectors and institutions. What is more 
likely is that  that public education will replace unequal access to knowledge  by 
increasing access to qualifications leading to  credential  inflation as qualifications are 
competed for but have less and less worth - either as  use value or  exchange value. 
 
A critical  exploration of the role of boundaries in the production and acquisition of  new 
knowledge enables us to argue that,  despite clear  political differences between neo-
liberals, who are obsessed with promoting markets and individual choice at any price, 
and the radical  social constructivists,  who want to free learners from what they see as 
the authoritarianism of expertise ,  they share an underlying  epistemological  similarity. 
Both end up with an instrumental view of knowledge with  its inevitable relativist 
consequences. Future 1 and Future 2 are in this sense epistemological mirror twins: they 
may differ in their proclaimed rhetorics, their means and desired goals, but their end 
result is, uncannily, the same.   
 
Future 3- Boundary maintaining and  boundary crossing as conditions  for the  
creation and acquisition of new knowledge in the emerging  global context 
Future 3 arises out of the critique and analysis we have made of Futures 1 and 2.  It will 
in a sense be a demonstration of what a social realist theory of knowledge can offer and 
2
 An example is the influential  Portuguese sociologist Bouoventura de Sousa Santos in his “epistemology of absent 
knowledges’ which he claims t goes beyond what he sees as the ‘blindness’ of  western science. Here is how he refers 
to it in a paper in the European Journal of Social Theory:
“the epistemology of absent knowledges starts from the premise that social practices are 
knowledge practices…(and that) non-science-based practices, rather than being ignorant practices, 
are practices of alternative rival knowledges. There is no apriori reason to favour one form of 
knowledge against another. “(de Sousa Santos 2001)
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why it is needed if our alternatives for the future are to have any degree of reliability . 
Future 3  is based on the assumption that there are specific kinds of social conditions 
under which  powerful  knowledge is acquired and produced. These conditions are not 
given; they are historical but also objective.  Whereas their historicity is denied in Future 
1-boundaries are given and taken for granted, the historicity and objectivity that is 
embodied in the critical role  of specialist communities is denied in Future  2.  At best 
Future 2 offers  an increasingly boundary-less and fragmented  global de-differentiation, 
together with a naïve optimism about the potential of new ‘bottom up’ social movements 
and epistemologies located in a metaphorical  ‘South’(e.g Hardt and Negri(2000), de 
Sousa Santos).   In contrast Future 3 emphasises the continuing role of boundaries, not as 
given entities, whether in the brain (neuro-science) , in the mind (a-historical rationalism) 
or in the world of human practice (pragmatism and dialectical materialism),  but in 
defining domain-specific but increasingly global  specialist communities as a basis both 
for the  acquisition and production of new knowledge and human progress more 
generally. The contemporary British philosopher  Christopher Norris expresses this 
scenario, following Habermas, as the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. We find it, albeit 
expressed in different ways,  in the theories of both Max Weber and Emil Durkheim 
writing over a century ago.   
The last section of this review explores a number of the features of  Future 3, their 
implications and how they may change. We shall consider, although our list makes no 
claim to be comprehensive, the following: 
• Boundaries and their types  – in relation to both knowledge and institutions and 
their interdependence-with particular reference  the case of disciplines
and their future
• Knowledge as real (powerful knowledge) and the social as real (knowledge of 
the powerful) and how the two ideas might be held together
• Preferred curriculum and pedagogic models 
• Implications for educational inequalities 
Boundaries and their types - the future of disciplines
The most critical point about knowledge in the next fifty years is to understand why some 
forms of knowledge tend towards specialization and others towards variation or 
diversification. These different tendencies in the development of knowledge have critical 
implications for the curriculum and education more generally. The first tendency poses 
questions about sequence, pace, and hierarchical organization, whereas the latter poses 
questions predominantly of choice, of what to include in the curriculum and, at its 
extremes, of the absence of any objective criteria at all.  The intimate link between 
knowledge form and curriculum organization is what a social realist approach to the 
curriculum seeks to elucidate.
It has become fashionable to proclaim the end of disciplinarity (Gibbons et al., 1994; 
Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2001) , but disciplines seem almost obstinately to linger on. 
They do, it is true, morph and adapt, as do all robust social forms, but reports of their end 
are much exaggerated. This does not mean that new disciplinary formations do not 
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periodically appear. They do. However  new formations invariably arise from  existing 
disciplines, first in the form of ‘regions’(Bernstein 2000) or groupings of existing 
disciplines around new problems; only later do they form into discrete identifiable 
formations, with their own stable communities.  The reason for this is that, as we said 
earlier, knowledge boundaries are not arbitrary, and the internal forms they foster and the 
social relations that sustain them shake down over time into stable socio-epistemic forms. 
These forms are determined by the strength of boundary appropriate to each form and 
consequently by how each form of knowledge develops or grows.
Disciplines differ, first, by their form of conceptual advance; and secondly, by their 
form of objectivity. As to the first: some disciplines tend towards robust, conceptually 
justifiable advances. Their knowledge structure is determined by their ever-advancing 
conceptual spine which tends towards unity (which does not mean that there is only one 
conceptual spine in the discipline). The curriculum implications of this type of conceptual 
advance is  that these disciplines in their mature form develop long ‘hierarchies of 
abstraction’ which are best learnt in sequence under the guidance of specialists 
(Mathematics and Science are the most obvious examples).  We may say that these 
disciplines are, in a specific sense, concept-rich.  It  is not that they necessarily  involve  
large numbers of concepts( the number of concepts does not distinguish them from a 
wide range of disciplines). It is that that they have long sequences of hierarchically-
related concepts. Getting stuck at any rung of the hierarchy usually means that conceptual 
learning stops. Other disciplines tend towards advance through variation or 
diversification of concepts; this, however, is less about concepts than it is about different 
contents or content-clusters, although there is usually a macro-conceptual organizing 
principle (the ‘past’ (or more abstractly time) for History and ‘space’ for Geography, for 
example) involved.  Still others develop practically, by developing new skills and  ways 
of doing things. Practical development may refer to new practices within  traditional 
manual crafts like cabinet making or to new forms of conceptual practice such as 
software development or website design.  Concepts, content, and skills are embedded in 
each discipline, but their relative salience is what differentiates them . 
All disciplines, in order to be disciplines, have objects of study, and in order to be robust 
and stable, display objectivity – that is to say, they possess legitimate, shared and stably 
reliable means for generating truth (Young and Muller, 2007). Truth is, by this account, a 
stable partnership between the objects of study and an informed community of 
practitioners. Disciplines, however, display differing albeit equivalent kinds of 
objectivity, depending on whether their object is natural or social3. The more social the 
object, the greater is the limit on the object being subsumed by the concepts of the 
discipline. Each form of objectivity nevertheless has to meet the same criteria of 
analytical adequacy – the simplest, maximum degree of subsumption by the disciplinary 
concept without distortion of the particular object.
The reason for rescuing a strong notion of objectivity from the Future 2-ists is so as to 
re-instate a strong and trustworthy notion of expertise (Collins and Evans, 2007). The 
3
 This does not deny, of course,  that in a deep sense, even the concepts of the natural 
sciences are social. 
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erosion of expertise and the loss of trust in specialist knowledge has been an inadvertent 
consequence of the relativism of boundary-less thinking (Muller, 2000). Trust in strong 
knowledge and in the judgements of specialist knowers has been hollowed-out by 
commonsense scepticism. Amongst adults in Europe at least this has led to a peculiar 
form of  self-deception – we deride specialised knowledge and knowers even as our lives 
are ever more dependent upon them. For example, we live in ever-more medicalised 
worlds even as medical litigation rates grow exponentially.
The youth of our society have not yet evolved the protective strategies of self-deception; 
many inherit a social derision towards strong knowledge from their parents and the 
media; as a consequence they fail at school for lack of trying hard enough to master 
something they pereceive as meriting such widespread diminishment (Menand, 1995). 
Even as specialist knowledge grows apace at the cutting edge borders, the English 
education system may finally be failing to produce enough highly specialised 
practitioners of the future because the young have inherited the popular wisdom that the 
prize is not worth the effort. This underwrites too the swing to instrumentalism.  If 
knowledge is not valued in its own right, then its social worth can only be measured by 
its usefulness. It is sobering to reflect that this corrosive popular wisdom is wholly absent 
in the emerging economies of South Korea, China and India. Silicon Valley in California 
could not have happened without a majority of engineers recruited from the East. Another 
such leap forward will almost cerainly emerge in the East rather than the West if Future 
2 prevails. Thus decisions about  the ‘curriculum of the future’ will have lasting long 
term effects.
Preferred forms of curriculum and pedagogy
To say that we live in a knowledge economy has two principal implications for 
schooling: the first is that the economy and the society that supports it places a premium 
on advances in knowledge, though paradoxically not necessarily on its reproduction, as 
we have shown above. This means that in a time of accelerated knowledge development, 
specialization and variation (or diversification)  become the dominant social codes, and 
the curriculum comes under increasingly frequent pressure to constantly adapt. This is 
less apparent in the university curriculum because their communities of practitioners live 
close to the nexuses of advances in knowledge – indeed, they are driving them. What it 
does mean, and where this becomes visible, is that this marks a new distinction between 
those higher institutions that are driving advances in knowledge  and those that are not. 
This hierarchy is currently very crudely marked by global rankings, and far more 
sophisticated examples are certain to be developed in due course. There is no doubt that 
the economies and societies  of the future will continue to require robust signaling 
mechanisms for ranking the productivity of knowledge producers. The second 
implication is that, even in those disciplines where concepts have traditionally taken a 
back seat – like History for example – advances will increasingly be conceptually driven. 
This does not mean that new historiographical approaches will be plucked from the air, 
rather that new digital technologies will allow forms of investigation that produce facts 
not previously able to be brought to light and require new conceptual advances. The MRI 
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scans that are driving  new advances in neurology are an example. There are parallels in 
demography, the Large Hadron Collider in physics and in nano-technology across a range 
of biological sciences.  
These developments  have some specific implications for the curriculum and for 
pedagogy. The elite curriculum, developed at a time when knowledge changed very 
slowly, was content-driven, and in its worst pedagogical form, was memorization and 
rote-learning driven. Consequently, the main alternative to the elite curriculum, which 
finds its most sophisticated expression in Future 2 thinking , has taken a stance against 
‘mere’ content and ‘mere’ rote – and in its radical forms against all stipulation of content 
and all forms of rote learning or memorisation.  This opposition  finds expression in the 
emergent Future 2 consensus around generic skills and  outcomes based curricula 
(Mangez, 2008; Lundahl et al., 2008). In other words, in articulating an alternative to the 
rigidities of Future 1,  Future 2 has swung from content-based to skills –based priorities. 
In both of these formats, especially in the latter, concepts get short shrift. This is because 
conceptual progression can only  be signaled or stipulated in conceptual not  skill-based 
terms. Because concept-based stipulations necessarily involve content (what is being 
conceptualized), this looks, at least to Future 2 sensibilities,  far too like the old  content-
based priorities of Future 1 . The result is that even in concept-rich subjects like science, 
the curriculum becomes under-stipulated in a Future 2 world as is indicated by the latest 
curriculum proposals for school science from the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority(Perks 2007) . 
These tendencies are not insurmountable obstacles for well resourced schools able to 
recruit teachers with strong subject qualifications, who can fill in the gaps.  It is however, 
inevitably a problem for schools servicing poor communities that cannot attract such 
teachers. What happens in such schools is that teachers lack clear markers in the 
curriculum and fall behind without knowing it, or miss out conceptual steps that may be 
vital later on (Reeves & Muller, 2005; Smith, Smith & Bryk, 1998).  At the same time, 
students fall behind  until a conceptual terminus is reached and they lack the resources or 
motivation   to progress.  This tendency  is exacerbated by the favoured non-directive 
(facilitative) pedagogy of Future 2 that eschews strong signals from the teachers, 
especially regarding evaluation and assessment. Contemporary research shows 
unequivocally that in the concept-rich subjects, strong signaling in assessment is critical 
for improving the performance of pupils from both poor as well as well off homes 
(Morais, Neves & Pires, 2004; Hoadley, 2007; Bourne, 2004; Muller & Gamble 
[forthcoming]).
Implications for educational inequalities
Future 3 argues for the importance of recognizing the ‘differentiatedness’ of knowledge. 
Two implications  follow. First, curricular formats that are too ideologically fixed on only 
content (Future 1) or skills (Future 2), gives some subjects short shrift, as well as having 
implications for the distribution of educational opportunities and achievement. Second, 
recognizing the differentiation of knowledge makes explicit that concepts, skills and 
content are all important and must be stipulated in the curriculum. Failure to do so means 
a slowing down of any progress that  has so far been made towards equalizing 
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epistemological access. This has implications for both social justice and the viability of a 
knowledge-based economy in the future.  
Concluding Note
We have framed our predictions for the future of education in terms of three scenarios 
and on the basis of a social realist theory of knowledge. We have indicated our preference 
for the  Future 3  scenario  on both social justice and epistemological grounds and pointed 
to the negative outcomes that are likely to follow from Future 1 and Future 2. As we have 
implied, these Futures are ideal types rather than predictive descriptions and must be 
judged as Max Weber pointed out long ago, in terms of how useful they are in identifying 
tendencies and  possible unintended consequences of current policies.
 On the  other hand we have said little about which Future is most likely to dominate in 
the next 30 years. This is both a political and an educational or cultural question. It is 
political because it relates to questions of power and the reality that the curriculum 
inevitably expresses ‘knowledge of the powerful’.  Insofar as the  neo-liberal 
combination of markets and accountability and institutional ranking continue to dominate 
educational policy, Future 2 is likely to dominate. Neo- liberalism, however, is under 
challenge, at least in the field of economics and financial management.  It is difficult to 
predict the impact of such changes on educational policy. One possibility is that a greater 
scepticism about the growth possibilities of service occupations may led to a resurgence 
of manufacturing and a greater valuing of science-based knowledge. 
Predicting likely futures is also a cultural question because, for better or worse, 
epistemological constraints will shape what curriculum policy can do, whoever has power 
and whatever the economic constraints. In a sense we might re-phrase Marx’s famous but 
ambiguous  aphorism about ‘men making history…” in recognizing that  epistemological 
constraints, like historical circumstances for Marx, are not “of our own choosing”. This 
review (and the research tradition that it is part of) is an attempt to re-assert the long term 
educational importance of these constraints. Our purpose is not to defend a conservative 
position or to look back to a ‘golden past’; far from it. It is to challenge the view that 
access to powerful knowledge is a right for all not just the few ( A view that we share) , 
with  a theory of ‘powerful knowledge’ and how it is acquired and the crucial role of 
formal education in that process. Not surprisingly, this leads us, at least in the short term, 
to a pessimistic view about the future. The short term possibilities of Future 2 present a 
seductive scenario for governments and international organizations as well as appearing 
to offer short cuts to some learners- perhaps real learning is easy and fun and more like a 
game. This, we are convinced is a false dawn and likely to punish the disadvantaged 
most. There is no sign of it catching on in our elite schools- quite the opposite. 
Futurology is in its nature a highly inexact science, because we never have all the facts at 
hand. That being said, two things do not necessarily follow: because we do not have all 
the facts at our disposal does not mean the trends we discern are not probable; more 
pertinently, because the scenarios we sketch and their projected consequences have a 
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certain apocalyptic ring to them does not mean they are necessarily exaggerated or 
wrong. As the novelist Philip Roth(1984)  once said, ‘Any satirist writing a futuristic 
novel who had imagined a President Reagan during the Eisenhower years would have 
been accused of perpetrating a piece of crude, contemptible, adolescent, anti-American 
wickedness, when, in fact, he would have succeeded, as prophetic sentry’.  That prophetic 
sentries are still welcome is certainly an encouraging sign.
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